

### 13 Austro-Hungarian foreign policy and the Balkan Wars

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The Habsburg Monarchy was strongly interested and involved in the Balkans, both economically and politically.<sup>1</sup> Since the occupation in 1878 and the later annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1908, Austria-Hungary pursued a rather conservative policy of territorial status quo, while the other Great Powers competed in imperialist expansion. The rivalry between Austria-Hungary and Russia over hegemony in the Balkans intensified since the beginning of the twentieth century and led to a deterioration in their relations. The creation of the Balkan League in 1912, initiated by St Petersburg and followed by a war against Turkey, worried and even frightened Vienna.<sup>2</sup>

The purpose of this chapter is to analyse Austro-Hungarian perceptions of the territorial and political changes in south-eastern Europe and the impact on their own position in the region during the Balkan Wars. What were the options for action and what consequences could arise from them? What role did the other Great Powers play in Vienna's decision-making process, especially Germany and Russia?

This study focuses on the main protagonists of Austro-Hungarian foreign policy: Foreign Minister Count Leopold Berchtold and his Ministry (*Ballhausplatz*), the heir-apparent Archduke Franz Ferdinand, the chief of the General Staff Conrad von Hötzendorf and the Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza.<sup>3</sup> Although 'ultimately responsible' for foreign

<sup>1</sup> F. R. Bridge, *From Sadowa to Sarajevo: The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary, 1866–1914* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1972); Samuel R. Williamson, *Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War* (New York: Macmillan, 1991).

<sup>2</sup> Alma Hannig, 'Angst und die Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg', in Patrick Bormann, Thomas Freiburger and Judith Michel (eds.), *Angst in den internationalen Beziehungen* (Göttingen: V&R Unipress, 2010), pp. 93–113, here pp. 96–7.

<sup>3</sup> John Leslie, 'The Antecedents of Austria-Hungary's War Aims: Policies and Policy-Makers in Vienna and Budapest before and during 1914', in E. Springer and L. Kammerhofer (eds.), *Archiv und Forschung: Das Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in seiner Bedeutung für die Geschichte Österreichs und Europas* (Vienna/Munich: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1993), pp. 307–94. For domestic and economic factors, see Fritz Klein, 'Politische und wirtschaftliche Interessen in der Balkanpolitik Deutschlands und

policy, Emperor Franz Joseph delegated almost everything to his Imperial and Royal Minister of Household and Foreign Affairs in the last years before the Great War.<sup>4</sup> The aim of this study is to scrutinize the predominant historiographical opinion that the Dual Monarchy acted aggressively in searching for a pretext to begin a war against Serbia in the period before the Great War.<sup>5</sup>

In February 1912 the former Austro-Hungarian ambassador to Russia, Berchtold, became the youngest Foreign Minister in Europe (at the age of forty-nine). He had no experience in the Viennese headquarters at the Ballhausplatz or in the Balkans, but as he took over Aehrenthal's personal staff, political continuity seemed to be guaranteed. During the Italo-Turkish War in Libya in 1911–12, the Habsburg Monarchy was concerned about Italian expansion and the weakening of the Ottoman Empire as well as its impact on the national movements in the Balkans. Its most important ally, Germany, did not share Austrian concerns and supported Italy; Berlin even failed to inform Vienna about the existence of the Bulgaro-Serb alliance, so Austria found out about it shortly before the First Balkan War broke out.<sup>6</sup> Berchtold's reaction was an announcement of the Austrian conservative policy of the status quo and peace, and at the same time a plea for support from the European powers.<sup>7</sup>

When the Balkan League began a war against the Ottoman Empire, the Danube Monarchy first followed a policy of 'wait and see' which was supported not only by the Foreign Ministry and the emperor, but also by Archduke Franz Ferdinand. They agreed that military involvement

Österreich-Ungarns 1912', in Fritz Klein (ed.), *Neue Studien zum Imperialismus vor 1914* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1980), pp. 109–34; Dörte Löding, 'Deutschlands und Österreich-Ungarns Balkanpolitik von 1912–1914 unter besonderer Berücksichtigung ihrer Wirtschaftsinteressen', PhD thesis (Hamburg, 1969); Jürgen Angelow, *Kalkül und Prestige: Der Zweibund am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Cologne/Weimar/Vienna: Böhlau, 2000).

<sup>4</sup> For example, the emperor presided during the 1870 crisis over five ministerial conferences in twelve days; in the three years prior to the First World War he attended none of the council's thirty-nine meetings. See Anatol Schmiel-Kowarzick (ed.), *Die Protokolle des Gemeinsamen Ministerrates der Österreichisch-ungarischen Monarchie 1908–1914* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 2011).

<sup>5</sup> Lothar Höbelt, *Franz Joseph I: Der Kaiser und sein Reich. Eine politische Geschichte* (Vienna/Cologne/Weimar: Böhlau, 2009), p. 144; Jürgen Angelow, 'Der "Kriegsfall Serbien" als Willenstherapie: Operative Planung, politische Mentalitäten und Visionen vor und zu Beginn des Ersten Weltkrieges', *Militärgeschichtliche Zeitschrift*, 21 (2002), pp. 315–36, here p. 319.

<sup>6</sup> Holger Afflerbach, *Der Dreibund: Europäische Großmacht- und Allianzpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg* (Vienna/Cologne/Weimar: Böhlau, 2002), pp. 692–708.

<sup>7</sup> *Österreich-Ungarns Außenpolitik von der bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914: Diplomatische Aktenstücke des österreichisch-ungarischen Ministeriums des Äußern (ÖUA)*, vol. IV (Vienna: Österreichischer Bundesverlag für Unterricht, Wissenschaft und Kunst, 1930), no. 3687, pp. 339–40. See also nos. 3633, 3744, pp. 285, 388.

made no sense for various reasons: Austria-Hungary had no further aims in the region, Russia could enter the war, Italy would probably ask for compensation, the costs would be too high and, finally, the support of Germany was not certain.<sup>8</sup>

After the rapid defeat and withdrawal of the Ottoman Empire from Europe, Austria-Hungary, a multinational state with a slight Slav majority, was concerned it was the next 'sick man of Europe' and a target of a future Serbian attack. Austria-Hungary found itself forced to rethink its Balkan policy. Almost daily a group of leading diplomats in the Ballhausplatz discussed different concepts of future policy in south-eastern Europe.<sup>9</sup> The result was a definition of the vital interests of Austria-Hungary: the status quo in the Balkans and the prevention of the settlement of any other state on the eastern coast of the Adriatic Sea. In order to achieve it, an Albanian state needed to be founded, and in the worst case protected by military action.<sup>10</sup> Serbia's wish for free access to the sea could not be accepted, as Vienna feared that Russia could use this port as a naval base. Abandoning the option of its own territorial expansion, Austria-Hungary was in fact willing to accept the territorial expansion of the Balkan states, if they promised to cooperate economically and to accept small adjustments to the Austrian borders as well as a free commercial port at Saloniki.<sup>11</sup> In the case of Bulgarian expansion, the Monarchy demanded territorial compensation for her ally Romania.<sup>12</sup> The purpose was to demonstrate the importance of the alliance and at the same time to maintain the rivalries between the Balkan states. Austria-Hungary acted on this basis during both Balkan Wars.

After the idea of a customs union with Belgrade – a project taken seriously but with little hope of success – had failed and Serbia's expansion reached the Adriatic, Russia carried out a trial mobilization along the Galician border.<sup>13</sup> Austria-Hungary responded by increasing troops in Galicia and Bosnia. Germany officially supported the Danube Monarchy, but kept its military activity low, while England and France heightened

<sup>8</sup> Franz Ferdinand to Berchtold, 1 October 1912, in Private Papers Berchtold, Státní oblastní archiv Brno (SOA), G 138, Inv. 457, K. 133. Berchtold to Franz Ferdinand, 16 October 1912, in Franz Ferdinand Papers, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA) Wien, K. 9.

<sup>9</sup> See *ÖUA*, vol. IV, nos. 4118, 4128, 4140, 4170, pp. 659–61, 668–70, 676, 698–702.

<sup>10</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. IV, no. 4170, pp. 698–9.

<sup>11</sup> Franz-Josef Kos, *Die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Interessen Österreich-Ungarns und Deutschlands in Südosteuropa 1912/1913: Die Adria-Hafen-, die Saloniki- und die Kaval-lafrage* (Vienna/Cologne/Weimar: Böhlau, 1996), pp. 15–48.

<sup>12</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. IV, nos. 4140 and 4170, pp. 676, 698–702.

<sup>13</sup> Kos, *Die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Interessen*, pp. 51–62, 65–7.

their military readiness.<sup>14</sup> Now the members of the Common Ministerial Council and the leaders of the military in Vienna had to discuss the measures 'in case of . . . the eventuality of a winter war, which could no longer be excluded'.<sup>15</sup> While Emperor Franz Joseph and Count Berchtold were still looking for a peaceful solution, the heir to the throne, Franz Ferdinand, and the military pleaded for war.<sup>16</sup> The Archduke planned to make arrangements with Germany, Romania and Russia in preparation for a war against Serbia. The designated special envoys for the negotiations in St Petersburg and Bucharest were two well-known 'hawks': the former military attaché in Russia, Prince Hohenlohe, and the former Chief of the General Staff, Conrad. The archduke himself went to Berlin, accompanied by the Chief of the General Staff, Schemua. While Hohenlohe's task was to pacify the Russian tsar and to keep Russia out of a war against Serbia, the archduke and Conrad sought assurances of support in case of a war. After the first conversation, the archduke wrote to the Foreign Minister Berchtold: 'Conversation with Emperor Wilhelm came out extraordinarily well . . . Emperor Wilhelm says that as soon as our prestige demands it we should take energetic action in Serbia, and we can be certain of his support.'<sup>17</sup> Later that same day, he let the Viennese ambassador in Berlin telegraph that the emperor would not fear 'even a world war'.<sup>18</sup> One week later Conrad could confirm that the Romanian king promised the same.<sup>19</sup>

But the German secretary of foreign affairs, Kiderlen-Wächter, who favoured a Great Powers' conference for the solution of oriental affairs, put a spanner in the works. Even before Franz Ferdinand came to Berlin he warned Berchtold and tried to put him off sending Hohenlohe to Russia.<sup>20</sup> The next step was an article in the semiofficial *Norddeutsche*

<sup>14</sup> David Stevenson, 'Militarization and Diplomacy in Europe before 1914', *International Security*, 22, 1 (1997), pp. 125–61, here pp. 140–5. See also military attachés' reports from October to December 1912, in *Kriegsarchiv Wien*, AhOB Gst Evidenzbüro, K. 1077.

<sup>15</sup> Berchtold Memoirs, 3 November 1912, Berchtold Papers, SOA Brno, K. 140.

<sup>16</sup> Alma Hannig, "'Wir schauen in der Loge zu': Thronfolger Franz Ferdinand und die Außenpolitik Österreich-Ungarns vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg', *Etudes Danubiennes*, 27 (2011), pp. 51–66, here pp. 63–6.

<sup>17</sup> Telegram from Franz Ferdinand, 22 November 1912, in *ÖUA*, vol. IV, no. 4571, p. 979. See also Franz Ferdinand to his wife Sophie, 21 November 1912: 'Everything goes brilliantly. I am very happy', and 22 November 1912: 'I feel gorgeous, I am very happy that everything went very well . . . I have already telegraphed to our Emperor.' Private Papers Sophie Hohenberg, Archiv Artstetten, K 668.

<sup>18</sup> Telegram, 22 November 1912, in *ÖUA*, vol. IV, no. 4559, p. 971.

<sup>19</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. IV, no. 4719, p. 1082. See also Conrad von Hötzendorf, *Aus meiner Dienstzeit 1906–1918*, vol. II (Vienna: Rikola, 1922), pp. 354–63.

<sup>20</sup> Hohenlohe Diaries, 20 and 21 November 1912, Hohenlohe Private Papers, Private Archive Fischer-Colbric Vienna.

*Allgemeine Zeitung*, the so-called 'cold shower' (*kalter Wasserstrahl*), in which he insisted that all questions would have to be settled by the powers jointly and not by any one power alone.<sup>21</sup> Although the German chancellor Bethmann Hollweg declared a few days later in the Reichstag that, should Austria-Hungary be attacked by a third party, Germany 'would have to step resolutely to the side of our ally',<sup>22</sup> Berchtold cancelled the Hohenlohe mission to Russia and accepted a British proposal for a conference in London. The heir to the throne still advocated war and achieved the re-appointment of Conrad as Chief of the General Staff; the Triple Alliance was renewed. Still, Berchtold convinced the emperor in a common audience with Franz Ferdinand that the peaceful solution of a Great Power conference would be the better option for the Habsburg Monarchy.<sup>23</sup>

The entire episode demonstrates that without the clear and explicit support of Germany an Austro-Hungarian war plan would fail. Even though he was deemed the 'Prince of Peace',<sup>24</sup> Franz Ferdinand caused the most dangerous war scare for the Danube Monarchy during the Balkan Wars.<sup>25</sup> It was the only time that Austria-Hungary made plans for a war against Serbia before July 1914 and it could only be prevented by the rational calculation of the German Foreign Secretary and the commitment of Berchtold and Franz Joseph to the peace.

As Britain and Germany had no vital interests in the Balkans and their main concern was Russo-Austrian antagonism threatening the European peace, they cooperated to produce an ambassadors' conference of the

<sup>21</sup> *Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, 25 November 1912. See also Ernst Jäckh (ed.), *Kiderlen-Wächter, der Staatsmann und Mensch*, vol. II (Berlin/Leipzig: DVA, 1924), p. 191.

<sup>22</sup> *Die Große Politik der europäischen Kabinette 1871–1914: Sammlung der diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes* (henceforth *GP*), vol. 33 (Berlin, 1927), pp. 445–6. Germany used a 'double strategy': it signalled to Vienna that it would not support the latter's belligerent policy and at the same time indicated in public, especially to the Triple entente, that Germany still stood by its ally. See Jost Düllfer, Martin Kröger and Rolf-Harald Wippich, *Vermiedene Kriege: Deeskalation von Konflikten der Großmächte zwischen Krimkrieg und Erstem Weltkrieg 1865–1914* (Munich, Oldenbourg, 1997), p. 652. Canis has argued against the 'double strategy': Konrad Canis, *Der Weg in den Abgrund: Deutsche Außenpolitik 1902–1914* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2011), p. 487.

<sup>23</sup> Hugo Hantsch, *Leopold Graf Berchtold: Grandseigneur und Staatsmann*, vol. I (Graz: Styria, 1963), pp. 362–4.

<sup>24</sup> Robert A. Kann, *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand Studien* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1976), pp. 21, 85. Rudolf Kiszling, *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand von Österreich-Este: Leben, Pläne und Wirken am Schicksalsweg der Donaumonarchie* (Graz/Cologne: Böhlau, 1953), p. 99.

<sup>25</sup> For example, Berchtold allowed the Austro-Hungarian embassy in Russia to secure all political papers in the embassy, as was usual in the case of war. HHStA Wien, PA I 493 Liasse XLV: Balkan-Konflagration 1912–1913 (Nrs. 1–14). See also Alma Hannig, *Franz Ferdinand: Die Biografie* (Vienna: Amalthea, 2013), pp. 177–84.

Great Powers.<sup>26</sup> Before the conference began, Berchtold defined his non-negotiable aims and instructed his ambassador Mensdorff to pursue the following: an autonomous Albania, compensation for Romania, a Serbian guarantee of peacekeeping and the ethnic principle for all territorial expansion. The Danube Monarchy was ready to accept the new borders, if the Balkan states declared them to be definitive and irreversible, which consequently would have prevented future expansion of Serbia. Again, Berchtold underlined the Austrian renouncement of its own expansion and the importance of peacekeeping.<sup>27</sup> Although the first conversations went well for Vienna, the discussion of the Albanian frontiers proved to be complicated and required concessions from the Danube Monarchy and Russia.<sup>28</sup> At the same time, Franz Joseph paved the way for a détente when he sent Prince Gottfried Hohenlohe to St Petersburg to explain that Austria did not have any aggressive intentions. The result was the disarmament agreement in March 1913.<sup>29</sup>

However, the ensuing weeks of the London conference were characterized by discussions on territorial questions between Russia and Austria-Hungary, insufficient support from Austria's allies, Serbian and Montenegrin disrespect of the resolutions adopted by the Great Powers and feeble reactions from the Great Powers.<sup>30</sup> Not until the Austrian threat of the use of military force did the Montenegrin troops withdraw from Albanian Scutari. And a few months later, Serbia provoked Vienna in the same way, backing down at the last possible moment, after the Habsburg Monarchy again issued an ultimatum in order to force Serbia to respect the treaties and to withdraw from Albania.<sup>31</sup> The enormous costs of the

<sup>26</sup> R. J. Crampton, 'The Balkans as a Factor in German Foreign Policy, 1912–1914', *Slavonic and East European Review*, 55 (1977), pp. 370–90, here p. 372. Richard Crampton, *The Hollow Detente: Anglo-German Relations in the Balkans, 1911–1914* (London: G. Prior, 1979). See also Herbert Michaelis, 'Die deutsche Politik während der Balkankriege 1912/13', PhD thesis (Waldenburg, 1929).

<sup>27</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. V, nos. 4924, 4925, pp. 126–31.

<sup>28</sup> Robert R. Kritt, 'Die Londoner Botschafterkonferenz 1912–1913', unpublished PhD thesis (University of Vienna, 1960), pp. 204–10. See also Dülffer, *Vermiedene Kriege*, p. 654 and Canis, *Weg*, pp. 488–90.

<sup>29</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. V, several reports from St Petersburg (4–10 February 1913), pp. 634–69. Günther Kronenbitter, 'Krieg im Frieden' *Die Führung der k.u.k. Armee und die Großmachtspolitik Österreich-Ungarns 1906–1914* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2003), p. 413. See also Alma Hannig, 'Prinz Gottfried zu Hohenlohe-Schillingsfürst (1867–1932): Ein Liebling der Kaiserhöfe', in Alma Hannig and Martina Winkelhofer (eds.), *Die Familie Hohenlohe: Eine europäische Dynastie im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert* (Cologne/Vienna/Weimar: Böhlau, 2013), pp. 240–2.

<sup>30</sup> The *Austrophobic* German ambassador Lichnowsky was of no help to Mensdorff, which even the German chancellor criticized. Bethmann Hollweg to Lichnowsky, 30 January 1913, *GP*, vol. 34/I, no. 12763, pp. 281–2.

<sup>31</sup> Williamson, *Austria-Hungary*, pp. 151–4.

mobilizations and the lack of support from Austria-Hungary's allies and other Great Powers made Berchtold doubt the efficacy of conference diplomacy. The Viennese ruling circles realized that 'the middle road of armed diplomacy was reaching a dead end'.<sup>32</sup>

A sharp difference of opinion between Vienna and Berlin over the future Balkan strategy started after the sudden death of Kiderlen-Wächter at the end of 1912. The new German State Secretary for Foreign Affairs was Jagow, a convinced Social Darwinist, who pleaded for Austrian cooperation with the non-Slavic states of Romania and Greece in order to 'contain the Slav wave on the Balkans'.<sup>33</sup> While the bulgarophile Kiderlen-Wächter supported Austrian plans of closer cooperation with Bulgaria, Jagow refused any further rapprochement towards Sofia and even recommended cooperation with Serbia.<sup>34</sup> Emperor Wilhelm II also demanded an alliance with Turkey, Romania and Greece as a 'bulwark against the alleged Panslavic danger'.<sup>35</sup> Not only Jagow and the emperor mistrusted Bulgaria and its king, but also Archduke Franz Ferdinand was convinced of King Ferdinand's unreliability and dependence on Russia and France.<sup>36</sup> The Ballhausplatz, however, stated simple reasons for Bulgaria's integration into the Triple Alliance: the strength and success of the Bulgarian army in the First Balkan War, and the shared interest in checking Serbia.<sup>37</sup>

One might assume that the conflict over the territories, which broke out between Serbia and Bulgaria in June 1913, provided the Austrians with the opportunity they had been waiting for, as the Balkan League came apart at that moment. In fact it created an even bigger problem, with Romania joining Serbia in the fight against Bulgaria. On the one hand, Austria felt obliged to support the interests of her Romanian ally (according to the mentioned aims from 1912); on the other, she pursued the prevention of a Greater Serbia, which could best be implemented by cooperation with Bulgaria. Berchtold's manoeuvring between his prospective allies was fatal: he put pressure on Bulgaria for bigger

<sup>32</sup> David Stevenson, *Armaments and the Coming of War: Europe, 1904–1914* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 275.

<sup>33</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. V, no. 6275, Jagow to Berchtold, 23 March 1913, pp. 1039–41, here p. 1039. See the very similar argumentation of the chancellor Bethmann Hollweg: *GP*, vol. 34/II, no. 13108, p. 641; see also Patrick Bormann's chapter in this volume (Chapter 14, pp. 257–61).

<sup>34</sup> *GP*, vol. 34/II, nos. 12965, 13012, 13292, pp. 492, 548–51, 825–7.

<sup>35</sup> *GP*, vol. 39, no. 15716, p. 337. *ÖUA*, vol. VI, no. 7566, p. 778.

<sup>36</sup> Franz Ferdinand to Berchtold, 16 January 1913, Berchtold Papers, SOA Brno, K. 133. *ÖUA*, vol. V, nos. 6127, 6275, pp. 941, 1040. *ÖUA*, vol. VI, nos. 6862, 7566, pp. 318, p. 777. *GP*, vol. 34/II, no. 13012, pp. 549–50.

<sup>37</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. V, nos. 5903, 6126, pp. 796–7, 939.

territorial compensations for Romania and, vice versa, demanded King Carol to content himself with minor gains.<sup>38</sup> Both sides were upset in the end, as they did not receive any concrete support from Vienna. King Ferdinand was actually wondering why Austria-Hungary did not take the opportunity to 'settle up with Serbia'.<sup>39</sup> Indeed, why not? Vienna was convinced that Bulgaria's military forces were better than those of the Turks, and was surprised at their rapid defeat. Franz Ferdinand as well as German leading circles refused any kind of intervention for the benefit of Sofia.<sup>40</sup> Unexpectedly, Conrad, who had argued for war against Serbia throughout the spring of 1913, proposed in July to support Serbia, only if it were to accept a position like that of Bavaria within the German Empire.<sup>41</sup> Finally, in addition to Emperor Franz Joseph and Count Berchtold, the Hungarian Prime Minister István Tisza supported a non-interventionist policy.

The Peace of Bucharest from August 1913, which ended the Second Balkan War, damaged Austro-German relations. The Habsburg Monarchy insisted on modifications of the peace settlement supporting Bulgarian interests, and Germany denied any possibility of revision.<sup>42</sup> While Vienna feared an enlarged Serbia in an alliance with Romania, Wilhelm II decorated and congratulated the King of Romania in a published telegram upon the conclusion of peace in his capital.<sup>43</sup> Finally, Austria had to submit and her defeat was total: Romania was alienated and Bulgaria greatly disappointed, while Serbia again expanded and the victory cemented the cooperation between Romania and Serbia. Vienna felt 'betrayed and sold out'<sup>44</sup> by Germany and it could neither rely on Romania nor on Bulgaria in the last months before the First World War.

In the aftermath of the Balkan Wars, the diplomats of the Dual Monarchy wrote several memoranda on future Balkan policy, not least because of disagreements with Germany. The first one was from 1 August 1913 and the last one from 24 June 1914, the so-called 'Matscheko'-memorandum. Based on selected published and unpublished documents

<sup>38</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VI, nos. 6833, 6903, 7152, 7399, pp. 298–9, 358, 521, 664–5.

<sup>39</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VI, no. 7838, p. 944.

<sup>40</sup> Crampton, 'Balkans', pp. 386–7. Franz Ferdinand to Berchtold, 4 July 1913 and 24 July 1913, Berchtold Papers, SOA Brno.

<sup>41</sup> Conrad to Berchtold, 2 July 1913, 12 July 1913, Berchtold Papers, SOA Brno. See also Horst Brettner-Messler, 'Die Balkanpolitik Conrad v. Hötzendorfs (Dezember 1912 bis Oktober 1913)', unpublished PhD thesis (University of Vienna, 1966) pp. 82–5.

<sup>42</sup> Williamson, *Austria-Hungary*, pp. 148–9; Ludwig Bittner, 'Die Verantwortlichkeit Österreich-Ungarns für den Ausbruch des Weltkrieges', in Josef Nadler and Heinrich Srbik (eds.), *Österreich: Erbe und Sendung im deutschen Raum* (Salzburg/Leipzig: Pustet, 1936), p. 195.

<sup>43</sup> *GP*, vol. 35, nos. 13732, 13733, 13734, 13741, pp. 359–67.

<sup>44</sup> *GP*, vol. 35, no. 13750, p. 379.

from this period, the following analysis indicates that, contrary to predominant opinion, the Ballhausplatz had formulated a consistent Balkan policy without any war plans against Serbia.<sup>45</sup> These concepts were fundamental for the policy-making process in Vienna until the assassination of the archduke. The main topics of the memoranda were always the same, but their importance and emphases varied.

'Of all Balkan problems the south-slavic or, rather, the Serbian question is the one of the greatest importance for the monarchy. It is closely aligned to our vital interests, its resolution in terms of Greater Serbia would be suitable to call our conditions of existence into question.'<sup>46</sup> With these words the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister addressed Germany after the great defeat of Bulgaria in the Second Balkan War and only a few days before the Bucharest Peace treaty was signed. The purpose of this communication was not to influence German attitudes towards the peace treaty, but to explain the dangerous situation that developed from the Balkan Wars and to present Austro-Hungarian ideas for a future Balkan policy. One message the Ballhausplatz repeatedly communicated was the necessity of adopting a common approach and acting jointly with Germany.<sup>47</sup> In an additional document written the same day Berchtold criticized Germany for deviating from the principle that it was understood that Austria-Hungary, because of the 'vital importance' of the Balkans for it, should shape the policy there and Germany would only adapt to it.<sup>48</sup> He reproached Berlin for its lack of understanding of Austro-Serbian antagonism and for giving unsolicited well-meaning advice for cooperation with Serbia, which only illustrated German 'misjudgement of the fundamental clash of interests'.<sup>49</sup> On the one hand, Berchtold used dramatic terminology describing Austro-Serbian hostility as 'permanent and unbridgeable' because of the Greater Serbian aspirations for Austrian territories. On the other, he underlined that Vienna had no aggressive intentions towards Serbia and territorial extension or annexation of Serbian territories were not desired.<sup>50</sup> The real purpose of this diplomatic

<sup>45</sup> The first study with a similar approach was Karl Schwendemann, 'Grundzüge der Balkanpolitik Österreich-Ungarns von 1908–1914', *Berliner Monatshäfte*, 8 (1930), pp. 203–26.

<sup>46</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 8157, pp. 1–7, here pp. 1–2.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.* See also *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 8708, pp. 353–8, no. 9482, pp. 974–9; *ÖUA*, vol. VIII, no. 9918, pp. 186–95.

<sup>48</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 8159, p. 8. <sup>49</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 8157, p. 3.

<sup>50</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 8157, p. 3. See the very similar argument when he addressed Romania, *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 9032, pp. 588–94, here pp. 591–2. The heir to the throne refused a war against Serbia firmly and warned Berchtold of Conrad's war-mongering. Franz Ferdinand to Berchtold, 4 July 1913 and 12 October 1913, Berchtold Papers, SOA Brno, K. 133.

offensive was to convince Germany of the political imperative of integrating Bulgaria into the common alliance. In order to prevent a conflict against Serbia or at least to create the best preconditions for a possible conflagration (Vienna expected it because of the perceived aggressiveness of Russia and Serbia), he suggested a 'configuration' of 'natural allies', which implied Sofia. Picking up the typical German counter-argument of Bulgaria's closeness to Russia, Berchtold disproved it, pointing out Russia's lack of support for Bulgaria during the Balkan Wars.<sup>51</sup> Finally, he explained that an alliance with Greece (the favourite solution of the German emperor and Jagow) would be no adequate substitute for Bulgaria, as Vienna would have no chance to win a war against Russia, Serbia and Bulgaria. Berchtold tirelessly repeated the arguments for cooperation with Sofia, as he knew that the 'Russian peril' and the belief in a forthcoming war between the Slavs and Teutons dominated the thinking of the German elites, which was the reason they stood for closer cooperation with Romania, Greece and Turkey.<sup>52</sup> These patterns recurred in all important diplomatic considerations in 1913 and 1914.<sup>53</sup>

For the period under examination, the Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza became one of the most important decision-makers and shapers of foreign policy in Austria-Hungary. His political memoranda were presented to the emperor, who appreciated his opinion, and Tisza's vote in the ministerial council became decisive. He often criticized the inaction and debility of the Great Power system, indicating the dangers of weakness especially for Vienna's position not just in the system itself but also in the Balkans.<sup>54</sup> He also stressed the importance of 'intimate cooperation' and the necessity of 'thorough debate' with Berlin regarding south-eastern Europe.<sup>55</sup> The Prime Minister pursued the idea of rapprochement between Romania and Bulgaria as a basis for stronger cooperation between the Central Powers and Bulgaria in order to block Russian and Serbian expansion in the Balkans. His tactic was to play on

<sup>51</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 8157, p. 4.

<sup>52</sup> Gottlieb von Jagow, *Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges* (Berlin: Reimer Hobbing, 1919), p. 193; see also the contribution of Patrick Bormann in this volume (Chapter 14, pp. 257–63) and Fritz T. Epstein, 'Der Komplex "Die russische Gefahr" und sein Einfluß auf die deutsch-russischen Beziehungen im 19. Jahrhundert', in Imanuel Geiss and Bernd-Jürgen Wendt (eds.), *Deutschland in der Weltpolitik des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts* (Düsseldorf: Bertelsmann 1973), pp. 143–59.

<sup>53</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 9032, pp. 588–94; *ÖUA*, vol. VIII, no. 9674, pp. 42–3, no. 9739, pp. 80–1.

<sup>54</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 8474, pp. 198–201, here p. 199. See also *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 8778, p. 400.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 200–1. In March 1914 Tisza considered 'complete harmony' with Germany to be necessary in political questions. See *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 9482, pp. 974–9, here p. 976.

German fear of Russia, always referring to the 'encirclement' of the Habsburg Monarchy and, thus, the Triple Alliance in general.<sup>56</sup> If Austro-Hungarian military forces were to be tied up by Russian, Serbian and eventually Romanian troops, then Germany could not expect any Austrian help on a probable eastern front, which would put Germany at an extreme risk.<sup>57</sup> According to Tisza, the only way out of this 'iron ring' was an alliance with Bulgaria, flanked by Romanian, Greek and Turkish benevolence.<sup>58</sup> The Hungarian prime minister made no plans for a war against Serbia, but preferred the diplomatic isolation of the aggressive neighbour. He urged calm and advised to 'keep cold blood' and to preserve the peace.<sup>59</sup>

The disagreements between Germany and Austria-Hungary in the autumn of 1913 created the need to send a special envoy, János Forgách, to Berlin to make Vienna's position clear in a direct conversation with Jagow. He actually reiterated Berchtold's and Tisza's arguments: no aggressive plans against Serbia, stronger cooperation with Bulgaria, a wish for better relations with Romania and Greece, which should be provided by Berlin, and a concordance of German and Austrian Balkan policies.<sup>60</sup> While Jagow was pessimistic about the future of Albania, Forgách revealed his pessimism about Romania. Ultimately, the special mission to Berlin ended without success.

In the last months before the outbreak of the war, the reliability of Romania came to the fore of Austro-Hungarian Balkan policy. Most of the reports from Romania and Bulgaria outlined the Austrophobic atmosphere among the leading circles, as well as the Romanian population, which was based on Hungarian-Romanian problems. This Austrophobia increased during the Second Balkan War, when Austria-Hungary failed to support Romania against Bulgaria.<sup>61</sup> On the other hand, Romania established a strategic alliance with Serbia, the 'deadly enemy'<sup>62</sup> of the Habsburg Monarchy, and the Ballhausplatz wondered what value the alliance with Romania now had. In order to improve and clarify relations between Vienna and Bucharest, an intimate of the heir-apparent, Ottokar Czernin, was appointed envoy to Romania.<sup>63</sup> The archduke was the only one among the Austrian ruling elites who still refused to cooperate with Bulgaria and who trusted in the loyalty and

<sup>56</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 8474, p. 200.

<sup>57</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 9482, pp. 974–9, here p. 976.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 977; Franz Ferdinand to Berchtold, 6 July 1913, Berchtold Papers, SOA Brno.

<sup>59</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 9482, pp. 974, 978. <sup>60</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 8708, pp. 353–8.

<sup>61</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 8699, pp. 346–7, no. 9032, pp. 588–94.

<sup>62</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 8708, p. 355. <sup>63</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 9032, p. 588.

authority of the Romanian king.<sup>64</sup> He expected Czernin to restore the confidence of other Romanian circles and to find a way to strengthen ties between Romania and Austria-Hungary.<sup>65</sup> The new envoy was supposed to explain to Romanian nationalist politicians that further maintenance of the Romanian-Serbian alliance was not 'compatible' with the Romanian-Austrian alliance, for a possible conflict between the Dual Monarchy and Serbia would lead to a 'clash of interests and duties' in Bucharest.<sup>66</sup>

Contrary to Franz Ferdinand's wishes, the foreign minister had instructed and authorized Czernin to put pressure on Romania to make the alliance with Vienna public. Should Vienna refuse, then Berchtold could at least estimate the 'real value' of the alliance and draw the necessary conclusions (fortification of the borders to Romania).<sup>67</sup> The Ballhausplatz was convinced that Romania was about to change alliances. All the efforts of the envoy to improve the relationships finally failed. His reports from the spring of 1914 painted a gloomy, Austrophobic ambience. The uncertainty about what would happen after King Carol's death was of particular concern. The risk of losing an ally and the probable consequences made Czernin demand a clarification of relations at all costs. His suggestion was to put more pressure on Romania to commit to the alliance, or even to publish the contract in the form of an apparent indiscretion.<sup>68</sup> In his report of 22 June 1914, Czernin proposed to test Romanian loyalty by supporting it in public and suggesting an alliance with Serbia. In the case of a negative reply, the alliance with Romania would be written off and an alliance with Bulgaria forged.<sup>69</sup> This plan was still mentioned in the so-called Matscheko-memorandum of 24 June, although the chances for Romanian loyalty decreased when the Russian royal visit heralded the deepening of Russo-Romanian relations.<sup>70</sup> As the addressee of the memorandum was Germany, it is very likely

<sup>64</sup> Franz Ferdinand to Berchtold, 16 January 1913, 6 July 1913, 8 August 1913, 12 October 1913, 10 April 1914, Berchtold Papers, SOA Brno. Many authors explain this attitude by citing his uncritical and rather emotional relationships to the Romanian king. Georg Franz, *Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand und die Pläne zur Reform der Habsburger Monarchie* (Brünn/Munich/Vienna: Rohrer 1943), p. 74. Friedrich Weissensteiner, *Franz Ferdinand: Der verhinderte Herrscher* (Vienna: Kremayr & Scheriau, 2007), pp. 198–9.

<sup>65</sup> Ottokar Czernin, *Im Weltkrieg* (Berlin/Vienna: Ullstein, 1919), p. 105.

<sup>66</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 9032, p. 592. <sup>67</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 9032, pp. 593–4.

<sup>68</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 9463, pp. 951–7. See also Czernin to Franz Ferdinand, 2 April 1914, Franz Ferdinand Papers; *ÖUA*, vol. VIII, no. 9902, p. 174. The archduke strictly rejected both solutions as well as putting any pressure on Romania.

<sup>69</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VIII, no. 9902, pp. 173–6, here p. 176. He had already made similar suggestions in his correspondence with the archduke in April and May 1914. Czernin to Franz Ferdinand, 2 April 1914, 16 May 1914, Franz Ferdinand Papers.

<sup>70</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VIII, no. 9918, pp. 186–95, here p. 193.

that Austria-Hungary's proposal of an alliance with Serbia was only an attempt to demonstrate Romanian disloyalty to her German ally in order to convince it of the necessity of an alliance with Bulgaria. After several urgent appeals from Tisza, Czernin and the Austro-Hungarian ambassador in St Petersburg, Szápáry, Berchtold charged two of his officials (Flotow and Matscheko) with the formulation of the memorandum that essentially dealt with the unreliability of Romania as a result of Russo-French efforts to destroy the Dual Monarchy.<sup>71</sup> Thus the principal endeavour of Viennese statesmen became the prevention of an encirclement by a new Balkan League (Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, Greece and eventually Bulgaria and Turkey) backed by Russia and France.<sup>72</sup> Berlin still refused Bulgaria as an alternative partner and criticized Berchtold for putting King Carol under pressure to make the Austro-Romanian alliance public.<sup>73</sup> Matscheko tried to shake Berlin when he underlined the dangers of Russian and French aggressiveness and their activity in the Balkans not only for the Habsburg Monarchy, but also for the Triple Alliance.<sup>74</sup> He stated that Romania had already deviated from her traditional foreign policy and that the situation had become risky because of Romanian-Serbian cooperation. The memorandum ended up asking Berlin to adopt Austro-Hungarian plans: should Bucharest refuse the aforementioned proposal, the Central Powers must form an alliance with Bulgaria and take military measures to fortify the frontiers.<sup>75</sup>

The Chief of the General Staff had serious doubts about Romanian reliability, and he demanded the fortification of the Hungarian-Romanian frontiers in Transylvania.<sup>76</sup> During the period under examination, Conrad and the Minister of War, Krobatin, pleaded for war against Serbia. The Austrian Prime Minister Stürgkh and the Common Minister of Finance Bilinski agreed and supported them.<sup>77</sup> Only a few diplomats discussed war as an option and most of them rejected it in the end.<sup>78</sup> So the only real 'military party' in Austria-Hungary consisted of these four people, who were outvoted by the 'doves'.

Analysing the last memoranda drafted only weeks before the assassination of the heir to the throne, the statement of Samuel Williamson

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.* *ÖUA*, vol. VIII, no. 9627, pp. 1–3.

<sup>72</sup> Alfred F. Pribram, *Austrian Foreign Policy, 1908–1918* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1923), p. 50.

<sup>73</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VIII, no. 9639, p. 14, no. 9739, p. 80.

<sup>74</sup> *ÖUA*, vol. VIII, no. 9918, pp. 187–9. <sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 194–5.

<sup>76</sup> Conrad, *Aus meiner Dienstzeit*, vol. III, pp. 647, 757.

<sup>77</sup> See *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 8779, pp. 397–403.

<sup>78</sup> For example Wilhelm von Storck, legation counsellor in Belgrade as well as Ottokar Czernin. See *ÖUA*, vol. VII, no. 8693, 9463, pp. 343, 951–5.

rings true: 'Of these the Rumanian question had the most urgency, the Serbian the most emotions, the Russian the most danger and the alliance-entente competition the most complications'.<sup>79</sup> The remarkable fact is that all important Austro-Hungarian initiatives for Balkan policy from the civil servants and diplomats of the Ballhausplatz, including the archduke and the Hungarian prime minister, did not contain aggressive war plans against Serbia.<sup>80</sup> There were no war aims either. Nor was there anything in these documents that would support the thesis that Vienna was looking for a pretext for war against Serbia. The Austro-Hungarian plan was a typical plan of classical diplomacy, with the final objective of preserving the peace and status quo: Austria-Hungary's fear of Serbia calling Austria's integrity into question and the danger of 'encirclement' by Serbia, Russia and Romania was to be overcome by a new Balkan League under Habsburg leadership. Bulgaria would be added to the alliance with Romania, and Germany would work to recruit Turkey and Greece as far as possible.

One of the main problems for Austro-Hungarian diplomacy was the differences between Vienna and Berlin. For months, German policy-makers had alternated between moments of support and declarations of extreme caution. Kiderlen-Wächter defused the only dangerous situation when Franz Ferdinand acted belligerently. Berlin was not willing to accept Bulgaria as a new partner and it lacked an understanding of the vital interests of a multi-ethnic state.<sup>81</sup> In Vienna, the prevailing impression was of a dominant Germany disregarding Austrian interests. There was even suspicion that Austrian interests were being relinquished to strengthen the Anglo-German détente. Szápáry remarked that Austro-Hungarian interests were sacrificed for German economic interests and better relations with Russia.<sup>82</sup> Indeed, Berlin was willing to respect Austrian vital interests only as far as Berlin 'considered them vital',<sup>83</sup> so the Austrian foreign office could never feel certain of German support. This finally caused distrust, disillusion and the feeling of being isolated

<sup>79</sup> Williamson, *Austria-Hungary*, p. 170. <sup>80</sup> Bridge, *From Sadowa*, p. 368.

<sup>81</sup> Berchtold and Hoyos regarded German refusal of Bulgaria as one of the crucial reasons why the peaceful alternative for Balkan policy failed. Berchtold to Hoyos, 29 August 1927 and Hoyos' response, 31 August 1927, Berchtold Private Papers, Private Archive of Count Hardegg, Vienna.

<sup>82</sup> See Jagow to Tschirschky, 17 March 1913, *GP*, vol. 34/II, no. 12982, p. 517; *ÖUA*, vol. VIII, no. 9656, p. 25.

<sup>83</sup> Günther Kronenbitter, 'Bundesgenossen? Zur militärpolitischen Kooperation zwischen Berlin und Wien 1912 bis 1914', in Walther L. Bernecker and Volker Dotterweich (eds.), *Deutschland in den internationalen Beziehungen des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts* (Munich: Vögel, 1996), p. 160.

and not being taken seriously.<sup>84</sup> A further interesting aspect was that the Habsburg Monarchy failed to factor Great Britain and Italy in its Balkan plans, although Italy was her ally and had some common interests regarding Albania.<sup>85</sup>

While the 'military party' pleaded for war, Berchtold, his diplomats, Franz Ferdinand and Tisza worked on peaceful solutions.<sup>86</sup> They were clear on the dangers connected with a war: they were unsure of the loyalty of their own allies; the integrity of the state and military were doubtful in the case of a war against a Slavic country; the danger of revolution; the high financial costs and the unpredictable reaction of the other Great Powers were all grave arguments against war. Besides, there was nothing to achieve in a war that could not be achieved peacefully, and territorial expansion was not desirable for domestic reasons. According to the archduke, Vienna could not gain anything in a war against Serbia but 'a pack of thieves and a few more murderers and rascals and a few plum trees'.<sup>87</sup> Austria-Hungary's military development, inherent military weakness and comparatively low military investments were also good arguments against war.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, no (great) power refused war as an instrument of policy, including Austria-Hungary. Therefore, it is not a paradox that most of the documents refer to a possible war: however, most assumed that Serbia or Russia would begin it. Vienna was definitely not waiting to provoke a conflict. It would have been perfectly happy if only Serbia had played the part of a small state respecting the prerogatives of the Great Powers. It was not any sort of pacifism on the part of Austria's leading officials, but rather their rational power-political calculations that kept them from intervening during the Balkan Wars and prompted them to seek a peaceful solution to the difficult situation in the Balkans.

Vienna's decisions to create Albania and prevent Serbian access to the Adriatic Sea were reached only after long negotiations during the

<sup>84</sup> Flotow to Bethmann Hollweg, 29 November 1913, *GP*, vol. 39, no. 15804, p. 461. Aleš Skřivan, *Schwierige Partner: Deutschland und Österreich-Ungarn in der europäischen Politik der Jahre 1906-1914* (Hamburg: Dölling und Galitz, 1999), p. 372.

<sup>85</sup> Afflerbach, *Dreibund*, pp. 803-10. See also Oliver J. Schmitt, *Die Albanen: Eine Geschichte zwischen Orient und Okzident* (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2012), pp. 140-9.

<sup>86</sup> Forgách to Berchtold, 30 August 1919, Berchtold Private Papers, Private Archive Hardegg. See also Paul W. Schroeder, 'Stealing Horses to Great Applause: Austria-Hungary's Decision in 1914 in Systemic Perspective', in Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson (eds.), *An Improbable War? The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture before 1914* (Oxford: Berghahn Books, 2007), pp. 17-42, here pp. 18-23; Skřivan, *Schwierige Partner*, p. 257.

<sup>87</sup> Franz Ferdinand to Berchtold, 1 February 1913, Berchtold Papers, SOA Brno.

Balkan Wars, and accompanied by the threat of violence, thus shaking the credibility of the European concert. An alliance with Bulgaria became the main priority in the Austro-Hungarian Balkan plans because of the successes of Serbia and Romania and their mutual cooperation during the Second Balkan War. There was no clash of interests between Vienna and Sofia, and they shared a vital interest: preventing the formation of a Greater Serbia. In the case of war against Serbia or Russia, an alliance with Bulgaria as a Slavic state could be of critical importance. The ideal constellation for Vienna, however, was an additional alliance with Romania and Turkey barring Russian influence in the West. Serbia would thus be isolated and Russian influence in the Balkans blocked. This would have diminished the general war risk and strengthened Austria-Hungary's position in south-eastern Europe. This peaceful alternative could not be implemented as long as Germany refused to accept Bulgaria as a new partner.

It is well known that the situation and, thus, the plans changed after the assassination of the heir to the throne.

## 14 German foreign policy and the Balkan Wars, 1912–1914

*Patrick Bormann*

For a considerable time, research on Anglo-German relations before the First World War dominated the historiography of the international system. 'The great naval game' with its theatrical staging not only impressed contemporaries but also historians of various generations.<sup>1</sup> Wolfgang J. Mommsen's thesis established the widespread notion that in Germany war was considered inevitable after the Second Moroccan Crisis, making 1911 the beginning of the prewar period.<sup>2</sup> But this traditional approach overestimates the importance of Anglo-German tensions and disregards the fact that the war broke out over Balkan matters, where Russia, Austria-Hungary and the Balkan states were the pivotal players – none of whom took any relevant part in the Second Moroccan Crisis. So it is not surprising that recent studies shift our focus to the complex situation on the Balkans on the eve of the war.<sup>3</sup> Other scholars have focused on the resurgence of Russia and its impact on the European system, while our understanding of British entente policy has been revised.<sup>4</sup> Comprehensive studies of the German case remain rare, although

<sup>1</sup> Jan Rüger, *The Great Naval Game: Britain and Germany in the Age of Empire* (Cambridge University Press, 2009). Paul Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism* (London and Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1980) remains the key text.

<sup>2</sup> Wolfgang J. Mommsen, 'Der Topos vom unvermeidlichen Krieg: Außenpolitik und öffentliche Meinung im deutschen Reich im letzten Jahrzehnt vor 1914', in Wolfgang J. Mommsen (ed.), *Der autoritäre Nationalstaat: Verfassung, Gesellschaft und Kultur des deutschen Kaiserreichs* (Frankfurt: Fischer-Taschenbuch Verlag, 1992), pp. 380–406.

<sup>3</sup> Christopher M. Clark, *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914* (London: Allen Lane, 2012).

<sup>4</sup> An early pioneer was Keith Wilson, *The Policy of the Entente: Essays on the Determinants of British Foreign Policy 1904–1914* (Cambridge University Press, 1985); also Keith Neilson, *Britain and The Last Tsar: British Policy and Russia 1894–1917* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), Stephen Schröder, *Die englisch-russische Marinekonvention: Das Deutsche Reich und die Flottenverhandlungen der Tripelentente am Vorabend des Ersten Weltkrieges* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006); Andreas Rose, *Zwischen Empire und Kontinent: Britische Außenpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 2011).