The Management of Savagery, written by Abu Bakr Naji in 2004, has easily been one of the principle writings since then. You create a state of chaos so from that chaos your state can build. You draw in the west to a fight they can never win, so that when they leave you can claim yourself as the winner and if they stay it will eventually just become a rallying call for more. Any civilians killed by security forces or western forces aids your cause greatly, because any iteration of you is just a battle in the long war, while your enemy is only looking at the present and near future.
	How Afghanistan has played out is actually a pretty good example, apart from the obvious in IS.
	Exactly it's a win-win for terrorists. Either your enemies admit humiliating defeat and withdraw leaving a power void or they continue to fight a war they can't win which results in continued resources for your organization. This is part of why I think the Obama policy for fighting ISIS was relatively effective; local groups are the main protagonists fighting to retake their country while the coalition provides its biggest strengths with intelligence, training and targeted strikes(artillery/air). In essence the coalition is assisting locals in taking back their homeland, as long as civilian casualties are minimized most of the benefits of a sustained conflict for terrorists are reduced.


 David Fromkin's piece on the Strategy of Terrorism (paywalled) written almost 40+ years ago:
    If this is an age of terror, then it has become all the more important for us to understand exactly what it is that terrorism means. Terrorism, as has been seen, is the weapon of those who are prepared to use violence but who believe that they would lose any contest of sheer strength. All too little understood, the uniqueness of the strategy lies in this: that it achieves its goal not through its acts but through the response to its acts. In any other such strategy, the violence is the beginning and its consequences are the end of it. For terrorism, however, the consequences of the violence are themselves merely a first step and form a stepping stone toward objectives that are more remote. Whereas military and revolutionary actions aim at a physical result, terrorist actions aim at a psychological result.
    But even that psychological result is not the final goal. Terrorism is violence used in order to create fear; but it is aimed at creating fear in order that the fear, in turn, will lead somebody else—not the terrorist—to embark on some quite different program of action that will accomplish whatever it is that the terrorist really desires. Unlike the soldier, the guerrilla fighter, or the revolutionist, the terrorist therefore is always in the paradoxical position of undertaking actions the immediate physical consequences of which are not particularly desired by him. An ordinary murderer will kill somebody because he wants the person to be dead, but a terrorist will shoot somebody even though it is a matter of complete indifference to him whether that person lives or dies. He would do so, for example, in order to provoke a brutal police repression that he believes will lead to political conditions propitious to revolutionary agitation and organization aimed at overthrowing the government. The act of murder is the same in both cases, but its purpose is different, and each act plays a different role in the strategies of violence.




I also keep a list of the major post-Cold War "visions," which has substantial overlap with yours:
    Huntington Clash
    Fukuyama End of History
    Brzezinski Out of Control
    Kaplan Coming Anarchy
    Luttwak "Fascism: Wave of the Future"
    Friedman Lexus & Olive Tree
    Barber Jihad McWorld
    Ohmae End of the Nation-State
    Zakaria "Rise of Illiberal Democracy"